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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
September 27, 1982 Conference 
List 15, Sheet 1 
No. 82-11 
MENNONITE BOARD OF 
MISSIONS 
v. 
ADAMS State/Civil Timel1 
1Appellant states that it filed a Petition to Transfer to the 
Indiana Supreme Court, which denied the petition on April 13, 
1982. Appellant does not include the denial in its statement, 
but the Clerk's office confirmed that it had a record of the 
denial in its file. The action i timely. 
~ . ~~ ~.~·,.....,~~ ~.cl.~~~ 
~ Ck..t ~ i. ~ 0/Y'- oOJ., (1'<44) t\~- «-A'!-~ 
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1. SUMMARY: Appellant mortgagee argues that 
Indiana tax sale statutes and redemption statutes violate 
appellant's due process and equal protection rights because they 
fail to give mortgagees proper notice of tax sales and redemption 
rights. 
,.------
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Moore executed a 
mortgage in favor of appellant and the mortgage was recorded. 
Moore was obligated to pay the property taxes but failed to so, 
although she continued to make her monthly mortgage payments. 
The property subject to the mortgage was sold to appellee. 
Appellant concedes that Moore received notice by mail of the 
sale, but 
v 
appellant received no personal notice because the 
Indiana tax sale statute provides only for notice by publication 
and posting to any party other than the owner. Indiana law also 
provides that any party with an interest in tax sale property may 
redeem the property ~ytime within two years of the tax sale, 
although only former owners are notified of the expiration of the 
redemption period and other parties apparently do not even 
receive constructive notice through publication. During the 
redemption period, Moore continued to make her mortgage payments, 
and never told appellant of the tax sale. Appellant learned of r-------
the sale only after the redemption period was over. ·Appellee 
. ----- ---then filed an-action to quiet title naming apperrant and Moore as 
defendants. Moore never responded to 
~fault judgment was entered against her. 
in favor of appellee on summary judgment. 
the complaint, and a 
The trial court found 
\ 
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On appeal, the Ind.Ct.App. affirmed against appellant's 
contentions that the tax sale and redemption statutes violated 
appellant's due process and equal protection rights because pre-
sale tax notice by publication to parties other than the owner 
violates due process, no notice of redemption rights violates due 
process, and the provision of personal notice of a tax sale to 
owners but not to mortgagees violates equal protection. As to 
pre-sale tax notice by publication, the court relied on its 
earlier decision in First Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Furnish, 367 
N.E.2d 596 (Ind.Ct.App. 1977) (contai~in juris.st. at 29). 
Furnish examined the contention that Mullane v. Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 u.s. 306 (1950) requires that a mortgagee who 
records must be given actual notice prior to tax sale, and 
concluded that Mullane and subsequent u.s. Sup.Ct. cases 
(Schroeder v.City of New York, 371 u.s. 208 (1962) and Walker v. 
City of Hutchinson, 352 u.S. 112 (1956) required that actual 
notice be given to owners of affected property, but that actual-
notice protection was not extended to any group other than 
owners. Furnish also surveyed state practice, and was able to 
find only one 1964 Arizona case that extended Mullane to 
mortgagees. See Laz v. Southwestern Land Co., 97 Ariz. 69 
(1964). The Furnish court concluded that mortgagees were not 
entitled to Mullane protection because the mortgagee, as a lender 
of money, could be expected to protect itself by keeping records 
of the mortgagor's payment of taxes. With respect to appellant's 
contention that due process required the state to provide notice 
to it of its right of redemption, the court relied on Short v. 
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Texaco, 406 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 1980), aff'd 102 S.Ct. 781 (1982), 
and held that "(a)s in Short, all mortgagees have notice of the 
right of redemption by the enactment of the tax sale statutes and 
a grace period of two years granted by those statutes to protect 
their interests." Finally, the court held that the legislative 
scheme that provides actual notice of a tax sale to an owner, but 
only notice by publication to a mortgagee, withstands rational 
basis analysis (increased protection for owners and collection of 
taxes) under both federal and state standards, which the court 
held to be coextensive. 
3. CONTENTIONS: On appeal, appellant argues that 
the court erred in following Furnish, which, appellant contends, 
is in conflict with Mullane and Greene v. Lindsey, 50 U.S.L.W. 
4483 (1982) • Appellant argues that there is substantial conflict 
in the state courts as to whether actual notice is required in 
tax-sale situations. Appellant contends that the court should not 
have relied on Short because its appeal was pending to this Court 
at the time, and that, in any event, the decision of this court 
that affirmed Short is not applicable because the mineral lapse 
statute in Short was self-executing whereas the statutes in the 
present case "require a series of affirmative acts by the State." 
. 
Appellant does not explicitly address the equal pr~tection 
argument apart from listing it as a question presented. Finally, 
appellant states that this Court has noted probable jurisdiction 
in cases similar to the present case, but has dismissed for 
reasons not applicable here. 
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4. DISCUSSION: Decisions of this Court cited by 
appellant concerning actual notice in various situations have not 
extended protection to parties other than the owners of the 
affected property, with the exception of Greene, which is clearly 
distinguishable. The state cases that appellant argues support 
its position also concern the owners of property with the 
exception of the 1964 Arizona case, which did extend Mullane to 
mortgagees. The cases that appellant cites as ones where the 
court noted probable jurisdiction and then dismissed are also 
cases involving owners and not mortgagees. Lower court 
resolution of the equal protection argument seems reasonable and 
appellant does not offer any new argument on appeal. According 
to the lower court, appellant offered no authority to show that 
the state is required to notify mortgagees of redemption rights, 
and appellant offers no argument in the statement other than that 
Texaco v. Short is not applicable, and his general reliance on 
Mullane throughout. 
I recommend DWSFQ. 
August 9, 1982 
There is no responsive motion. 
Francione Op'n in pet'n 
September 27, 1982 
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Mennonite Board of Missions /..o ~ 
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p~ ~ U-t-~11~ \, 
Questions Presented 
1. Does due process require that a mortgagee receive 
actual notice of a tax sale? -------- -
2. Does due process require that a mortgagee receive 
II , \ 
actual notice of a right of redemption following a ta~ sale? 
--'W~ 
3. Does it violate equal protection to give actual 






A. Statutory Background 
Under certain conditions, Indiana law permits a county 
to recover delinquent taxes by selling the property at public 
auction. Ind. Code §6-1.1-24-1 (1978). Such auctions are con-
ducted at the county courthouse, §6-1.1-24-2 (4), on the second 
Monday in August each year, §6-1.1-24-2(5). Prior to the auc-
tion, the county auditor must post a specified notice "at a pub-
lie place of posting in the county courthouse at least three (3) 
weeks before the date of sale." §6-1.1-24-3. In addition, the 
law requires that ~ce "shall be pr i..E_ted in twg_J3 ) new~apers 
~ 
which represent different political parties and which are pub-
lished in the county," §6-l.l-22-4(b), "once each week for three 
( 3) consecutive weeks before the sale," §6-1.1-24-3. P~rty (h+. 
owners are also entitled to "a notice of the sale by certified ~ -- -----.__.. -......... 
mail at their last address" 21 days prior to the auction. -
§6-1.1-24-4. 
Indiana law provides a redemption period of two years ab...u.)t 
followi~ a tax ~tion. During this redemption period, an in-~ 
terested person may pay the tax delinquency and retain his inter- 2 ~ 
est in the property. §6-1.1-25-1. At the end of the redemption 
period, if no redemption has occurred, the tax sale purchaser 
receives a tax deed vesting him with a fee simple absolute estate 
free of prior encumbrances. §6-1.1-25-4. The former owner is 
entitled to receive a notice by certified mail between 30 and 60 
days before a tax deed is executed. §6-1.1-25-6 • 
... , •. 
B. .Facts 
In 1973, ap'ant Mennonite Board of 
veyed certain property on Stevens Avenue in Elkhart, Indiana, to 
one Moore. She, in turn, executed a mortgage on the property in 
favor of MBM to secure $14,000 in indebtedness. 
the mortgage was that Moore would pay property taxes. After --1974, however, she neglected to do so--despite the fact that she 
continued to make her mortgage payments. 
On August 8, 1977, the property was sold to ap'ee Adams -
at a tax sale for $1,167.75. The county sent the required notice 
to Moore, and published the required public notices. During the 
two-year redemption period, Moore continued to make her mortgage 
--------------------~~ 
payments, but she did not redeem the property. On August 10, -
1979, Adams received a tax deed for the property, which he re-
corded on August 14. MBM did not have actual knowledge of the 
sale or the redemption period until after Adams had received and 
recorded his tax deed. 
c. Decisions Below 
In November, 1979, Adams instituted the present action 
against Moore and MBM to quiet his title. Moore never responded 
and a default judgment was entered against her. MBM defended the 
action on the grounds that the tax sale procedure violated the 
v--
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The Elkhart Superior 
Court (Jones) granted summary judgment for Adams. 
Staton, 
On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals (Hoffman, 
Garrard) ~firmed. The public notice was adequate to 
I 
protect mortgagees' rights prior to the tax sale. The enactment 
of the tax statutes and the two-year redemption period were ade-
quate to protect mortgagees' rights prior to the execution of the 
tax deed. The statutory scheme survives an equal protect ion 
challenge under rational basis scrutiny. 
The Indiana Supreme Court denied discretionary review. 
II. Discussion 
A. Notice Prior to the Sale 
The legal standard is well established here. "'An ele-
mentary and fundamental requirement of due process in any pro-
ceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportu-
nity to present their objections.'" Greene v. Lindsey, U.S. 
(1982) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 u.s. 306, 314 (1950)) (emphasis added by Greene Court). 
has been satisfied here is essen-
Prior cases offer some guidance, of 
involved detainer actions, posting no-
tices on the doors of tenants in a public house project was held 
inadequate. I~, which involved the settlement of ac-
counts of a common trust fund, notice by publication was held to 
be adequate when the trust company did not know the addresses of 
interested parties, but inadequate when it did know the address-
es. In the latter situation, notice by ordinary mail would have 
been adequate. The circumstances in each case, however, are dif-
ferent, and the final decision must be made on the basis of what 
is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to ap-
prise interested parties of the pendency of the action." 
In my view, the Indiana procedures do satisfy due proc-
ess requirements. Several factors influence this conclusion. ------------~ ~It is important to remember that mortgagees tend to be very 
~ sot._histicated part~es. They are commonly banks. They are in-
Y"-~variably parties that have the financial wherewithal to invest 
~ ~ge sums for substantial periods. One cannot equate mortgagees 
~with Greene's public housing pro'ect ten nts or Mullane's small 
~~~~nvestors. 2) T ere were simple procedures that MBM could and 
~ should have ta en to protect itself. Tax sales occur only once a ~ 
year on a date fixed by statute. MBM had no excuse not to know 
that a tax sale would be held on August 8, 1977. As a mortgagee, 
it should have known to investigate the situation and to learn if 
any of its properties were subject to being sold. Again the sit-
uation is unlik~ and Mullane, where detainer actions and 
judicial account settlements may happen at any time, and inter-
ested parties have no particular reason to watch for them. 
Furthermore, the required investigation in this case would have 
been a simple matter, for notice was posted at a specified place 
in the county courthouse. It also seems likely that MBM, as an -
organization with offices in the ~nty for over 50 xe~rs, would 
......... 'WI' -----
know what the papers of record were. It thus should have known 
in late July. ~MBM 
could easily have sent a representative to the auction to protect 
------------------------~----------to look for the newspaper notices 
its interests, ® Due process standards must be set with re-
. . 
spect to reasonably 1 ikely situations. As Mullane recognized, 
ordinary mail may be lost, but that does not mean that notice by 
ordinary mail is inadequate. Here the Indiana statutes protect 
.., 
mortgagees under ordinary circumstances. I suspect that a mort-
gagor who fails to pay taxes commonly fails to make mortgage pay-
ments, too. At the very least, I would be surprised if many 
mortgagors continue to make mortgage payments for two years after 
their property has been auctioned at a tax sale. A mortgagor 
with the money to make payments generally would prefer to prevent 
I( 
the loss of the property under the tax sale. It is only in pecu-
liar situation~such as this, therefore, that a tax sale would 
-~ 
occur without' the mortgagee learning that something was wrong 
with the mortgagor's finances. 
B. MBM's Other Contentions 
If MBM is going to succeed on this appeal, it will have 
to do so on its first ground. Once the Court concludes that no-
tice prior to the tax sale was adequate, it follows that the 
failure to provide notice during the redemption period is also 
permissible. If anything, the notice prior to the tax sale 
should be greater, since the mortgagee has a better opportunity 
to protect its interest prior to the auction. But in practice, 
the reverse is true. The mortgagee has all the opportunities 
that it had before the sale and, in addition, has two years for 
further investigation. 
The equal protection challenge is totally merit ess. 
Mortgagees are not a suspect class, so the statutory scheme need 
I~ 
only survive rational basis scrutiny. There are clear, rational 
reasons for distinguishing between property owners and mortgag--
ees. (1) Owners tend to be less sophisticated, thus requiring -creater protection. (2) Owners have much more to lose. An owner 
loses the fee simple estate, which in many cases means losing a 
basic necessity of life. The mortgagee loses only its lien, a 
nonpossessory interest tradition ally accorded less protect ion. 
The mortgagee generally retains its contractual right to repay-
ment of the de3t from the mortgagor for whatever that might be 
worth. (3) The primary purpose of the statutory scheme is to~ 
insure collection of property taxes. Owners are generally the 
parties liable for the taxes. It is thus rational that they 
should receive the principal notice. These distinctions between 
owners and mortgagees are probably sufficient to enable the 
scheme to survive even heightened scrutiny. They are certainly 
adequate for rational basis scrutiny. 
III. Conclusion 
\ ~ The decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals should be 
~ ';J-~rmed. Under all of the circumstances, the notice provisions 
~ of the tax sale scheme are sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
~of due process. The distinctions between owners and mortgagees 
~5 are justified for rational reasons. 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-11 
MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS, APPELLANT v. 
RICHARD C. ADAMS 
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting . 
. Today, the Court departs significantly from its prior deci-
sions and holds that before the State conducts any proceed-
ing that will affect the legally protected interests of any 
party, the State must provide notice to that party by means 
certain to ensure actual notice as long as the party's identity 
and location are "reasonably ascertainable." Ante, p. 7. 
Applying this novel and unjustified principle to the ~ 
present case, the Court decides that the mortgagee involved 
deserved more than the notice by publication and posting 
that were provided. I dissent because the Court's approach 
is unwarranted both as a general rule and as the rule of this 
case. 
I 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 
314 (1950), the Court established that the "elementary and 
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding 
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated 
under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections." We emphasized that notice is con-
stitutionally adequate when "the practicalities and peculiari-
ties of the case ... are reasonably met," id., at 314-315. 
See also Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 115 
7Ai1 ~ ~. soc ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~~ Py~/ ~z'/p~ 
~ "1'/fl? ~ U;~ ~- ~ p kn'.l' ~ 
llta;( ~ z;. ~ ~- / ~ 'YM ~ ~~ 
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(1956); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208, 
211-212 (1962); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444, 449--450 
(1982). The key focus is the "reasonableness" of the means 
chosen by the State. Mullane, supra, 339 U. S., at 315. 
Whether a particular method of notice is reasonable depends 
on the outcome of the balance between the "interest of the 
State" and "the individual interest sought to protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 314. Of course, "[i]t is 
not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that 
the [State] ... must adopt." Greene, supra, 456 U. S., at 
455, n. 9. It is the primary responsibility of the State to 
strike this balance, and we will upset this process only when 
the State strikes the balance in an irrational manner. 
From Mullane on, the Court has adamantly refused to 
commit "itself to any formula acheiving a balance between 
these interests in a particular proceeding or determining 
when constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must 
meet." 339 U. S., at 314. Indeed, we have recognized "the 
impossibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the kind of 
notice that must be given; notice will vary with the circum-
stances and conditions." Walker, supra, 352 U. S., at 115 
(emphasis added). Our approach in these cases has always 
reflected the general principle that "[t]he very nature of due 
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures univer-
sally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria & 
Restaurant Workers Union, Local.J,73 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 
886, 895 (1961). See also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., 
319, 334-335 (1976). 
A 
Although the Court purports to apply these settled princi-
ples in this case, its decision today is squarely at odds with 
the balancing approach that we have developed. The Court 
now holds that whenever a party has a legally protected prop-
erty interest, "[n]otice by mail or other means as certain to 
ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition 
82-11-DISSENT 
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to any proceeding which will adversely affect the interest[] 
... if [the party's] name and address are reasonably as-
certainable." Ante, p. 7. Without knowing what state and 
individual interests will be at stake in future cases, the Court 
espouses a general principle ostensibly applicable whenever 
any legally protected property interest may be adversely af-
fected. This is a flat rejection of the view that no "formula" 
can be devised that adequately evaluates the constitutional-
ity of a procedure created by a State to provide notice in a 
certain class of cases. Despite the fact that Mullane itself 
accepted that constructive notice satisfied the dictates of due 
process in certain circumstances/ the Court,· citing Mullane, 
now holds that constructive notice can never suffice when-
ever there is a legally protected property interest at stake. 
In seeking to justify this broad rule, the Court holds that 
although a party's inability to safeguard its interests may re-
sult in imposing greater notice burdens on the State, the fact 
that a party may be more able "to safeguard its interests does 
not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation." Ante, 
p. 7. Apart from ignoring the fact that it is the totality of 
circumstances that determines the content of the State's ob-
ligation to provide notice in particular cases, the Court also 
neglects to consider that the constitutional obligation im-
posed upon the State may itself be defined by the party's abil-
ity to protect its interest. As recently as last Term, the 
Court held that the focus of the due process inquiry has al-
ways been the effect of a notice procedure on "a particular 
class of cases." Greene, supra, 456 U. S., at 451 (emphasis 
added). In fashioning a broad rule for "the least sophisti-
cated creditor," ante, p. 7, the Court ignores the well-settled 
principle that "procedural due process rules are shaped by 
'In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 U. S. 306, 314 
(1950), we held that "[p]ersonal service has not in all circumstances been 
regarded as indispensable to the process due to residents, and it has more 
often been held unnecessary as to nonresidents." 
82-11-DISSENT 
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the risk of error inherent in the truth finding process as ap-
plied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions." 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 344 (1976); see also Cal-
ifano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 696 (1979). If the mem-
bers of a particular class generally possess the ability to safe-
guard their interests, then this fact must be taken into 
account when we consider the "totality of circumstances," as 
required by Mullane. Indeed, the criterion established by 
Mullane "'is not the possibility of conceivable injury but the 
just and reasonable character of the requirements, having 
reference to the subject with which the statute deals."' 339 
U. S., at 315 (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 
u. s. 47, 67 (1911). 
B 
The Court also holds that the condition for receiving notice 
under its new approach is that the name and address of the 
party must be "reasonably ascertainable." In applying this 
requirement to the mortgagee in this case, the Court holds 
that the State must exercise "reasonably diligent efforts" in 
determining the address of the mortgagee, id., at 6, n. 3, and 
suggests that the State is required to make some effort "to 
discover the identity and the whereabouts of a mortgagee 
whose identity is not in the public record." Ibid. Again, the 
Court departs from our prior cases. In all of the cases relied 
on by the Court in its analysis, the State either actually knew 
the identity or incapacity of the party seeking notice, or that 
identity was "very easily ascertainable." Schroeder, supra, 
371 U. S., at 212-213. See also Mullane, supra, 339 U. S., 
at 318; Covey v. Town of Summers, supra, 351 U. S. 141, 146 
(1956); Walker, supra, 352 U. S., at 116, Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 175 (1974). 2 Under the Court's de-
2 In Mullane, the Court contrasted those parties who identity and 
whereabouts are known or "at hand" with those "whose interests or 
whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained." 339 U. S., at 
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cision today, it is not clear how far the State must go in pro-
viding for reasonable efforts to ascertain the name and ad-
dress of an affected party. This uncertainty becomes 
particularly ominous in the light of the fact that the duty to 
ascertain identity and location, and to notify by mail or other 
similar means, exists whenever any legally protected interest 
is implicated. 
II 
Once the Court effectively rejects Mullane and its progeny 
by accepting a per se rule against constructive notice, it ap-
plies its rule and holds that the mortgagee in this case must 
receive personal service or mailed notice because it has a le-
gally protected interest at stake, and because the mortgage 
was publicly recorded. See ante, p. 6. If the Court had ob-
served its prior decisions and engaged in the balancing re-
quired by Mullane, it would have reached the opposite 
result. 
-It cannot be doubted that the State has a vital interest in 
the collection of its tax revenues in whatever reasonable 
manner that it chooses: "In authorizing the proceedings to 
enforce the payment of the taxes upon lands sold to a pur-
chaser at tax sale, the State is in exercise of its sovereign 
power to raise revenue essential to carry on the affairs of 
state and the due administration of the laws .... 'The proc-
ess of taxation does not require the same kind of notice as is 
required in a suit at law, or even in proceedings for taking 
private property under the power of eminent domain.' " 
Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 89 (1904) (quoting Bell's Gap 
Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 239 
318, 317. This language must be read in the light of the facts of Mullane, 
in which the identity and location of certain beneficiaries were actually 
known. In addition, the Court in Mullane expressly rejected the view 
that a search "under ordinary standards of diligence" was required in that 
case. Id., at 317. 
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(1890)). The State has decided to accommodate its vital in-
terest in this respect through the sale of real property on 
which payments of property taxes have been delinquent for a 
certain period of time. 3 
The State has an equally strong interest in avoiding the 
burden imposed by the requirement that it must exercise 
"reasonable" efforts to ascertain the identity and location of 
any party with a legally protected interest. In the instant 
case, that burden is not limited to mailing notice. Rather, 
the State must have someone check the records and ascertain 
with respect to each delinquent tax payer whether there is a 
mortgagee, perhaps whether the mortgage has been paid off, 
and whether there is a dependable address. 
Against these vital interests of the State, we must weigh 
the interest possessed by the relevant class-in this case, 
mortgagees. 4 Contrary to the Court's approach today, this 
interest may not be evaluated simply by reference to the fact 
that we have frequently found constructive notice to be inad-
equate since Mullane. Rather, such interest "must be 
judged in the light of its practical application to the affairs of 
men as they are ordinarily conducted." North Laramie · 
Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1925). 
Chief Justice Marshall wrote long ago that "it is part of 
common prudence for all those who have any interest in 
[property], to guard that interest by persons who are in a 
situation to protect it." The Mary, 13 U. S. (9 Cranch) 126, 
144 (1815). We have never rejected this principle, and, in-
3 The Court suggests that the notice that it requires "may ultimately 
relieve the county of a more substantial administrative burden if the mort-
gagee arranges for payment of the delinquent taxes prior to the tax sale." 
Ante, p. 7, 4. The Court neglects the fact that the State is a better judge 
of how it wants to settle its tax debts than is this Court. 
'This is not to say that the rule espoused must cover all conceivable 
mortgagees in all conceivable circumstances. The flexibility of due proc-
ess is sufficient to accommodate those atypical members of the class of 
mortgagees. 
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deed, we held in Mullane that "[a] State may ~ndulge" the as-
sumption that a property owner "usually arranges means to 
learn of any direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary 
rights." 339 U. S., at 316. When we have found construc-
tive notice to be inadequate, it has always been where an 
owner of property is, for all purposes, unable to protect his 
interest because there is no practical way for him to learn of 
state action that threatens to affect his property interest. 
In each case, the adverse action was one that was completely 
unexpected by the owner, and the owner would become 
aware of the action only by the fortuitous occasion of reading 
"an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages 
of a newspaper ... [that may] not even name those whose 
attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform ac-
quaintances who might call it to attention." Mullane, 
supra, 339 U. S., at 315. In each case, the individuals had 
no reason to expect that their property interests were being 
affected. 
This is not. the case as far as tax sales and mortgagees are 
concerned. Unlike condemnation or an unexpected account-
ing, the assessment of taxes occurs with regularity and 
predictability, and the state action in this case cannot reason-
ably characterized as unexpected in any sense. Unlike the 
parties in our other ~ases, the Mennonite Board had a 
regular event, the'assessment of taxes, upon which to focus, 
in its effort to protect its interest. Further, approximately 
95% of the mortgage debt outstanding in the United States is 
held by private institutional lenders and federally-supported 
agencies. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States: 1982-83, 511 (103d ed.). 5 It is highly un-
6 The Court holds that "a mortgage need not involve a complex commer-
cial transaction among knowledgeable parties . . . . " Ante, p. 7. This is 
certainly true; however, that does not change the fact that even if the 
Board is not a professional money lender, it voluntarily entered into a fairly 
sophisticated transaction with Moore. As the court below observed: "The 
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likely, if likely at all, that a significant number of mortgagees 
are unaware of the consequences that ensue when their mort-
gagors fail to pay taxes assessed on the mortgaged property. 
Indeed, in this case, the Board itself required that Moore pay 
all property taxes. 
There is no doubt that the Board could have safeguarded 
its interest with a minimum amount of effort. The county 
auctions of property commence by statute on the second 
Monday of each year. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-2(5). The 
county auditor is required to post notice in the county court-
house at least three weeks before the date of sale. Ind. 
Code§ 6-1.1-24-3(a). The auditor is also required to publish 
notice in two different newspapers once each week for three 
weeks before the sale. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-3(a); Ind. Code 
6-1.1-22-4(b). The Board could have supplemented the pro-
tection offered by the State with the additional measures 
suggested by the court below: The Board could have required 
that Moore provide it with copies of paid tax assessments, or 
could have required that Moore deposit the tax monies in an 
escrow account, or could have itself checked the public 
records to determine whether the tax assessment had been 
paid. Pet. for Cert. 27. 
When a party is unreasonable in failing to protect its inter-
est despite its ability to do so, due process does not require 
that the State save the party from its own lack of care. The 
balance required by Mullane clearly weighs in favor of find-
ing that the Indiana statutes satisfied the requirements of 
due process. Accordingly, I dissent. 
State cannot reasonably be expected to assume the risk of its citizens' busi-
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This appeal raises the question whether notice by publica-
tion and posting provides a mortgagee of real property with 
adequate notice of a proceeding to sell the mortgaged prop-
erty for nonpayment of taxes. 
I 
To secure an obligation to pay $14,000, Alfred Jean Moore 
executed a mortgage in favor of appellant Mennonite Board 
of Missions (MBM) on property in Elkhart, Indiana, that 
Moore had purchased from MBM. The mortgage was re-
corded in the Elkhart County Recorder's Office on March 1, 
1973. Under the terms of the agreement, Moore was re-
sponsible for paying all of the property taxes. Without 
MBM's knowledge, however, she failed to pay taxes on the 
property. 
Indiana law provides for the annual sale of real property on 
which payments of property taxes have been delinquent for 
fifteen months or longer. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-1 et seq. 
Prior to the sale, the county auditor must post notice in the 
county courthouse and publish notice once each week for 
three consecutive weeks. § 6-1.1-24-3. The owner of the 
property is entitled to notice by certified mail to his last 
known address. § 6-1.1-24-4. 1 Until 1980, however, Indi-
' Because a mortgagee has no title to the mortgaged property under 
"'\'I ' .. 
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ana law did not provide for notice by mail or personal service 
to mortgagees of property that was to be sold for nonpay-
ment of taxes. 2 
After the required notice is provided, the county treasurer 
holds a public auction at which the real property is sold to 
the highest bidder. § 6--1.1-24-5. The purchaser acquires a 
certificate of sale which constitutes a lien against the real 
property for the entire amount paid. § 6--1.1-24-9. This 
lien is superior to all other liens against the property which 
existed at the time the certificate was issued. Ibid. 
The tax sale is followed by a two-year redemption period 
during which the "owner, occupant, lienholder, or other per-
son who has an interest in" the property may redeem the 
property. § 6--1.1-25--1. To redeem the property an indi-
vidual must pay the county treasurer a sum sufficient to 
cover the purchase price of the property at the tax sale, the 
amount of taxes and special assessments paid by the pur-
chaser following the sale, plus an additional percentage speci-
fied in the statute. §§ 6--1.1-25--2, 6--1.1-25--3. The county 
in turn remits the payment to the purchaser of the property 
at the tax sale. 
If no one redeems the property during the statutory re-
demption period, the purchaser may apply to the county au-
ditor for a deed to the property. Before executing and deliv-
ering the deed, the county auditor must notify the former 
owner that he is still entitled to redeem the property. 
§ 6--1.1-25--6. No notice to the mortgagee is required. If 
Indiana law, the mortgagee is not considered an "owner" for purposes 
of§ &-1.1-24--4. First Savings & Loan Assn. of Central Indiana v. Fur-
nish, 367 N. E. 2d 596, 600, n. 14 (Ind. App. 1977). 
' Ind. Code § &-1.1-24--4.2, added in 1980, provides for notice by certi-
fied mail to any mortgagee of real property which is subject to tax sale 
proceedings, if the mortgagee has annually requested such notice and has 
agreed to pay a fee, not to exceed $10, to cover the cost of sending notice. 
Because the events in question in this case occurred before the 1980 
amendment, the constitutionality of the amendment is not before us. 
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the property is not redeemed within thirty days, the county 
auditor may then execute and deliver a deed for the property 
to the purchaser, § &--1.1-25--4, who thereby acquires "an es-
tate in fee simple absolute, free and clear of all liens and en-
cumbrances." § &--1.1-25--4( d). 
After obtaining a deed, the purchaser may initiate an ac-
tion to quiet his title to the property. § 6.1.1-25-14. The 
previous owner, lienholders, and others who claim to have an 
interest in the property may no longer redeem the property. 
They may defeat the title conveyed by the tax deed only by 
proving, inter alia, that the property had not been subject 
to, or assessed for, the taxes for which it was sold, that the 
taxes had been paid before the sale, or that the property was 
properly redeemed before the deed was executed. § 6.1.1-
25-16. 
In 1977 Elkhart County initiated proceedings to sell 
Moore's property for nonpayment of taxes. The County pro-
vided notice as required under the statute: it posted and 
published an announcement of the tax sale and mailed notice 
to Moore by certified mail. MBM was not informed of the 
pending tax sale either by the county auditor or by Moore. 
The property was sold for $1,167.75 to appellee Richard Ad-
ams on August 8, 1977. Neither Moore nor MBM appeared 
at the sale or took steps thereafter to redeem the property. 
Following the sale of her property, Moore continued to make 
payments each month to MBM, and as a result MBM did not 
realize that the property had been sold. On August 16, 
1979, MBM first learned of the tax sale. By then the re-
demption period had run and Moore still owed appellant 
$8,237.19. 
In November 1979, Adams filed a suit in state court seek-
ing to quiet title to the property. In opposition to Adams' 
motion for summary judgment, MBM contended that it had 
not received constitutionally adequate notice of the pending 
tax sale and of the opportunity to redeem the property fol-
lowing the tax sale. The trial court upheld the Indiana tax 
•' . 
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sale statute against this constitutional challenge. The Indi-
ana Court of Appeals affirmed. 427 N. E. 2d 686 (1981). 
We noted probable jurisdiction,-- U. S. -- (1982), and 
we now reverse. 
II 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co ., 339 
U. S. 306, 314 (1950), this Court recognized that prior to an 
action which will affect an interest in life, liberty, or property 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a State must provide "notice reasonably calcu-
lated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties 
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity 
to present their objections." Invoking this "elementary and 
fundamental requirement of due process," ibid, the Court 
held that published notice of an action to settle the accounts 
of a common trust fund was not sufficient to inform beneficia-
ries of the trust whose names and addresses were known. 
The Court explained that notice by publication was not rea-
sonably calculated to provide actual notice of the pending 
proceeding and was therefore inadequate to inform those who 
could be notified by more effective means such as personal 
service or mailed notice: 
"Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resi-
dent an advertisement in small type inserted in the back 
pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside 
the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds 
that the information will never reach him are large in-
deed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced 
when as here the notice required does not even name 
those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does 
not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. 
In weighing its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence 
with actual notice we are unable to regard this as more 
than a feint." Id., at 315. 
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In subsequent cases, this Court has adhered unwaiveringly 
to the principle announced in Mullane. In Walker v. City of 
Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112 (1956), for example, the Court 
held that notice of condemnation proceedings published in a 
local newspaper was an inadequate means of informing a 
landowner whose name was known to the city and was on the 
official records. Similarly, in Schroeder v. City of New 
York, 371 U. S. 208 (1962), the Court concluded that publica-
tion in a newspaper and posted notices were inadequate to 
apprise a property owner of condemnation proceed~nJs when 
his name and address were readily ascertainable ~om both 
deed records and tax rolls. Most recently, in Greene v. l 
Lindsey,-- U. S. -- (1982), we held that posting a sum-
mons on the door of a tenant's apartment was an inadequate 
means of providiyg notice of forcible entry and detainer ac-
tions. See als<VMemphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 
436 U. S. 1, 13-15 (1978)( Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 
U. S. 156, 174-175 (1974); Bank of Marin v. England, 385 
U. S. 99, 102 (1966); Covey v. Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 146-147 
(1956); City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co ., 
344 u. s. 293, 296-297 (1953). 
1 
This case is controlled by the analysis in Mullane. To 
begin with, a mortgagee possesses a substantial property in-
terest that is significantly affected by a tax sale. Under In-
diana law, a mortgagee acquires a lien on the owner's prop-
erty which may be conveyed together with the mortgagor's 
personal obligation to repay the debt secured by the mort-
gage. Ind. Code § 32-8-11-7. A mortgagee's security in-
terest generally has priority over subsequent claims or liens 
attaching to the property, and a purchase money mortgage 
takes precedence over virtually all other claims or liens in-
cluding those which antedate the execution of the mortgage. 
Ind. Code § 32-8-11-4. The tax sale immediately and drasti-
cally diminishes the value of this security interest by grant-
ing the tax-sale purchaser a lien with priority over that of all 
other creditors. Ultimately, the tax sale may result in the 
Jrv 
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complete nullification of the mortgagee's interest, since the 
purchaser acquires title free of all liens and other encum-
brances at the conclusion of the redemption period. \ 
Since a mortgagee clearly has a legally protected property 
interest, he is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to ap-
prise him of a pending tax sale. Cf. Wiswall v. Sampson, 55 
U. S. 52, 67 (1852). When the mortgagee is identified in a 
mortgage that is p~d, the county may employ 
notice by mail, personal service, or any other method equally 
likely to ensure that Qgjs in fact notified. 3 But construc-
tive notice to a mortgagee does not satisfy the mandate of 
Mullane. 
Neither notice by publication and posting, nor mailed no-
tice to the property owner, are means "such as one desirous 
of actually informing the [mortgagee] might reasonably adopt 
to accomplish it." Mullane, supra, at 315. Because they 
are designed primarily to attract prospective purchasers to 
the tax sale, publication and posting are unlikely to reach 
those who, although they have an interest in the property, do 
not make special efforts to keep abreast of such notices. 
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, supra, at 116; New York v. 
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra, at 296; Mullane, 
supra, at 315. Notice to the property owner, who is not in 
privity with his creditor and who has failed to take steps nee-
3 In this case, the mortgage on file with the county recorder identified 
the mortgagee only as "MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS a corpora-
tion, of Wayne County, in the State of Ohio." We assume that the mort-
gagee's address could have been ascertained by reasonably diligent efforts. 
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 
(1950). Simply mailing a letter to "Mennonite Board of Missions, Wayne 
County, Ohio," quite likely would have provided actual notice, given "the 
well-known skill of postal officials and employees in making proper delivery 
of letters defectively addressed." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 
397-398 (1914). We do not suggest, however, that a governmental body is 
required to undertake extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and 
whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public record. 
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essary to preserve his own property interest, also cannot be 
expected to lead to actual notice to the mortgagee. Cf. N el-
son v. New York City, 352 U. S. 103, 107-109 (1956). The 
County's use of these less reliable forms of notice is not rea-
sonable where, as here, "an inexpensive and efficient mecha-
nism such as mail service is available." Greene v. Lindsey, 
supra, at --. 
Personal service or mailed notice is re uired even though 
sopli1sticate ere i ors have means at their disposal to 
discover whether property taxes have not been paid and 
whether tax sale proceedings are therefore likely to be initi-
ated. In the first place, a mortgage need not involve a com-
plex commercial transaction among knowledgeable parties, 
and it may well be the least sophisticated creditor whose se-
curity interest is threatened by a tax sale. More impor-
tantly, a party's ability to take steps to safeguard its inter-
ests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation. 
It is true that particularly extensive efforts to provide notice 
may often be required when the State is a~re of a party's 
inexperience or incompetence. See, e. g., Memphis Light, 
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, supra, at 13--15; Covey v. 
Somers, supra. But it does not follow that the State may 
forego even the relatively modest administrative burden of 
providing notice by mail to parties who are particularly re-
sourceful.4 Cf. New York v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 
supra, at 297. Notice by mail or other means as certain to 
ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition 
to a proceeding which will adversely affect the interests of 
any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial 
practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertain-
able. Furthermore, a mortgagee's knowledge of delin-
quency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice 
'Indeed, notice by mail to the mortgagee may ultimately relieve the 
county of a more substantial administrative burden if the mortgagee ar-
ranges for payment of the delinquent taxes prior to the tax sale. 
? 
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that a tax sale is pending. The latter "was the information 
which the [County] was constitutionally obliged to give per-
sonally to the appellant-an obligation which the mailing of a 
single letter would have discharged." Schroeder v. City of 
New York, supra, at 214. 
We therefore conclude that the manner of notice provided 
to appellant did not meet the requirements of the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Indiana Court of Appeals is reversed and 
the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsis-
tent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
' This appeal also presents the question whether, before the county au-
ditor executes and delivers a deed to the tax-sale purchaser, the mortgagee 
is constitutionally entitled to notice of its right to redeem the property. 
Cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 229 (1946). Because we conclude that 
the failure to give adequate notice of the tax sale proceeding deprived ap-
pellant of due process of law, we need not reach this question. 
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RICHARD C. ADAMS 
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[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting . 
. Today, the Court departs significantly from its prior deci-
sions and holds that before the State conducts any proceed-
ing that will affect the legally protected interests of any 
party, the State must provide notice to that party by means 
certain to ensure actual notice as long as the party's identity 
and location are "reasonably ascertainable." Ante, p. 7. 
Applying this novel and unjustified principle to the th 
present case, the Court decides that the mortgagee involved 
deserved more than the notice by publication and posting 
that were provided. I dissent because the Court's approach 
is unwarranted both as a general rule and as the rule of this 
case. 
I 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 
314 (1950), the Court established that the "elementary and 
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding 
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated 
under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections." We emphasized that notice is con-
stitutionally adequate when "the practicalities and peculiari-
ties of the case ... are reasonably met," id., at 314-315. 
See also Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 115 
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(1956); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208, 
211-212 (1962); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444, 449--450 
(1982). The key focus is the "reasonableness" of the means 
chosen by the State. Mullane, supra, 339 U. S., at 315. 
Whether a particular method of notice is reasonable depends 
on the outcome of the balance between the "interest of the 
State" and "the individual interest sought to protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 314. Of course, "[i]t is 
not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that 
the [State] ... must adopt." Greene, supra, 456 U. S., at 
455, n. 9. It is the primary responsibility of the State to 
strike this balance, and we will upset this process only when 
the State strikes the balance in an irrational manner. 
From Mullane on, the Court has adamantly refused to 
commit "itself to any formula acheiving a balance between 
these interests in a particular proceeding or determining 
when constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must 
meet." 339 U. S., at 314. Indeed, we have recognized "the 
impossibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the kind of 
notice that must be given; notice will vary with the circum-
stances and conditions." Walker, supra, 352 U. S., at 115 
(emphasis added). Our approach in these cases has always 
reflected the general principle that "[t]he very nature of due 
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures univer-
sally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria & 
Restaurant Workers Union, Local.J,73 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 
886, 895 (1961). See also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., 
319, 334--335 (1976). 
A . 
Although the Court purports to apply these settled princi-
ples in this case, its decision today is squarely at odds with 
the balancing approach that we have developed. The Court 
now holds that whenever a party has a legally protected prop-
erty interest, "[n]otice by mail or other means as certain to 
ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition 
... 
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to any proceeding which will adversely affect the interest[] 
... if [the party's] name and address are reasonably as-
certainable." Ante, p. 7. Without knowing what state and 
individual interests will be at stake in future cases, the Court 
espouses a general principle ostensibly applicable whenever 
any legally protected property interest may be adversely af-
fected. This is a flat rejection of the view that no "formula" 
can be devised that adequately evaluates the constitutional-
ity of a procedure created by a State to provide notice in a 
certain class of cases. Despite the fact that Mullane itself 
accepted that constructive notice satisfied the dictates of due 
process in certain circumstances,' the Court,· citing Mullane, 
now holds that constructive notice can never suffice when-
ever there is a legally protected property interest at stake. 
In seeking to justify this broad rule, the Court holds that 
although a party's inability to safeguard its interests may re-
sult in imposing greater notice burdens on the State, the fact 
that a party may be more able "to safeguard its interests does 
not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation." Ante, 
p. 7. Apart from ignoring the fact that it is the totality of 
circumstances that determines the content of the State's ob-
ligation to provide notice in particular cases, the Court also 
neglects to consider that the constitutional obligation im-
posed upon the State may itself be defined by the party's abil-
ity to protect its interest. As recently as last Term, the 
Court held that the focus of the due process inquiry has al-
ways been the effect of a notice procedure on "a particular 
class of cases." Greene, supra, 456 U. S., at 451 (emphasis 
added). In fashioning a broad rule for "the least sophisti-
cated creditor," ante, p. 7, the Court ignores the well-settled 
principle that "procedural due process rules are shaped by 
1 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 
(1950), we held that "[p]ersonal service has not in all circumstances been 
regarded as indispensable to the process due to residents, and it has more 
often been held unnecessary as to nonresidents." 
'. 
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the risk of error inherent in the truth finding process as ap-
plied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions." 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 344 (1976); see also Cal-
ifano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 696 (1979). If the mem-
bers of a particular class generally possess the ability to safe-
guard their interests, then this fact must be taken into 
account when we consider the "totality of circumstances," as 
required by Mullane. Indeed, the criterion established by 
Mullane "'is not the possibility of conceivable injury but the 
just and reasonable character of the requirements, having 
reference to the subject with which the statute deals."' 339 
U. S., at 315 (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 
u. s. 47, 67 (1911). 
B 
The Court also holds that the condition for receiving notice 
under its new approach is that the name and address of the 
party must be "reasonably ascertainable." In applying this 
requirement to the mortgagee in this case, the Court holds 
that the State must exercise "reasonably diligent efforts" in 
determining the address of the mortgagee, id., at 6, n. 3, and 
suggests that the State is required to make some effort "to 
discover the identity and the whereabouts of a mortgagee 
whose identity is not in the public record." Ibid. Again, the 
Court departs from our prior cases. In all of the cases relied 
on by the Court in its analysis, the State either actually knew 
the identity or incapacity of the party seeking notice, or that 
identity was "very easily ascertainable." Schroeder, supra, 
371 U. S., at 212-213. See also Mullane, supra, 339 U. S., 
at 318; Covey v. Town of Summers, supra, 351 U. S. 141, 146 
(1956); Walker, supra, 352 U. S., at 116, Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974). 2 Under the Court's de-
2 In Mullane, the Court contrasted those parties who identity and 
whereabouts are known or "at hand" with those "whose interests or 
whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained." 339 U. S., at 
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cision today, it is not clear how far the State must go in pro-
viding for reasonable efforts to ascertain the name and ad-
dress of an affected party. This uncertainty becomes 
particularly ominous in the light of the fact that the duty to 
ascertain identity and location, and to notify by mail or other 
similar means, exists whenever any legally protected interest 
is implicated. 
II 
Once the Court effectively rejects Mullane and its progeny 
by accepting a per se rule against constructive notice, it ap-
plies its rule and holds that the mortgagee in this case must 
receive personal service or mailed notice because it has a le-
gally protected interest at stake, and because the mortgage 
was publicly recorded. See ante, p. 6. If the Court had ob-
served its prior decisions and engaged in the balancing re-
quired by Mullane, it would have reached the opposite 
result. 
·It cannot be doubted that the State has a vital interest in 
the collection of its tax revenues in whatever reasonable 
manner that it chooses: "In authorizing the proceedings to 
enforce the payment of the taxes upon lands sold to a pur-
chaser at tax sale, the State is in exercise of its sovereign 
power to raise revenue essential to carry on the affairs of 
state and the due administration of the laws .... 'The proc-
ess of taxation does not require the same kind of notice as is 
required in a suit at law, or even in proceedings for taking 
private property under the power of eminent domain.'" 
Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 89 (1904) (quoting Bell's Gap 
Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 239 
318, 317. This language must be read in the light of the facts of Mullane, 
in which the identity and location of certain beneficiaries were actually 
known. In addition, the Court in Mullane expressly rejected the view 
that a search "under ordinary standards of diligence" was required in that 
case. Id., at 317. 
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(1890)). The State has decided to accommodate its vital in-
terest in this respect through the sale of real property on 
which payments of property taxes have been delinquent for a 
certain period of time. 3 
The State has an equally strong interest in avoiding the 
burden imposed by the requirement that it must exercise 
"reasonable" efforts to ascertain the identity and location of 
any party with a legally protected interest. In the instant 
case, that burden is not limited to mailing notice. Rather, 
the State must have someone check the records and ascertain 
with respect to each delinquent tax payer whether there is a 
mortgagee, perhaps whether the mortgage has been paid off, 
and whether there is a dependable address. 
Against these vital interests of the State, we must weigh 
the interest possessed by the relevant class-in this case, 
mortgagees. 4 Contrary to the Court's approach today, this 
interest may not be evaluated simply by reference to the fact 
that we have frequently found constructive notice to be inad-
equate since Mullane. Rather, such interest "must be 
judged in the light of its practical application to the affairs of 
men as they are ordinarily conducted." North Laramie 
Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1925). 
Chief Justice Marshall wrote long ago that "it is part of 
common prudence for all those who have any interest in 
[property], to guard that interest by persons who are in a 
situation to protect it." The Mary, 13 U. S. (9 Cranch) 126, 
144 (1815). We have never rejected this principle, and, in-
a The Court suggests that the notice that it requires "may ultimately 
relieve the county of a more substantial administrative burden if the mort-
gagee arranges for payment of the delinquent taxes prior to the tax sale." 
Ante, p. 7, 4. The Court neglects the fact that the State is a better judge 
of how it wants to settle its tax debts than is this Court. 
• This is not to say that the rule espoused must cover all conceivable 
mortgagees in all conceivable circumstances. The flexibility of due proc-
ess is sufficient to accommodate those atypical members of the class of 
mortgagees. 
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deed, we held in Mullane that "[a] State may indulge" the as-
sumption that a property owner "usually arranges means to 
learn of any direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary 
rights." 339 U. S., at 316. When we have found construc-
tive notice to be inadequate, it has always been where an 
owner of property is, for all purposes, unable to protect his 
interest because there is no practical way for him to learn of 
state action that threatens to affect his property interest. 
In each case, the adverse action was one that was completely 
unexpected by the owner, and the owner would become 
aware of the action only by the fortuitous occasion of reading 
"an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages 
of a newspaper ... [that may] not even name those whose 
attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform ac-
quaintances who might call it to attention." Mullane, 
supra, 339 U. S., at 315. In each case, the individuals had 
no reason to expect that their property interests were being 
affected. 
This is not the case as far as tax sales and mortgagees are 
concerned. Unlike condemnation or an unexpected account-
ing, the assessment of taxes occurs with regularity and 
predictability, and the state action in this case cannot reason-
ably characterized as unex ected in any sense. Unlike the 
parties in our other ath6f cases, the Mennonite Board had a 
regular event, the assessment of taxes, upon which to focus, 
in its effort to protect its interest. Further, approximately 
95% of the mortgage debt outstanding in the United States is 
held by private institutional lenders and federally-supported 
agencies. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States: 1982-83, 511 (103d ed.). 5 It is highly un-
~ The Court holds that "a mortgage need not involve a complex commer-
cial transaction among knowledgeable parties .... " Ante, p. 7. This is 
certainly true; however, that does not change the fact that even if the 
Board is not a professional money lender, it voluntarily entered into a fairly 
sophisticated transaction with Moore. As the court below observed: "The 
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likely, if likely at all, that a significant number of mortgagees 
are unaware of the consequences that ensue when their mort-
gagors fail to pay taxes assessed on the mortgaged property. 
Indeed, in this case, the Board itself required that Moore pay 
all property taxes. 
There is no doubt that the Board could have safeguarded 
its interest with a minimum amount of effort. The county 
auctions of property commence by statute on the second 
Monday of each year. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-2(5). The 
county auditor is required to post notice in the county court-
house at least three weeks before the date of sale. Ind. 
Code § 6-1.1-24-3(a). The auditor is also required to publish 
notice in two different newspapers once each week for three 
weeks before the sale. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-3(a); Ind. Code 
6-1.1-22-4(b). The Board could have supplemented the pro-
tection offered by the State with the additional measures 
suggested by the court below: The Board could have required 
that Moore provide it with copies of paid tax assessments, or 
could have required that Moore deposit the tax monies in an 
escrow account, or could have itself checked the public 
records to determine whether the tax assessment had been 
paid. Pet. for Cert. 27. 
When a party is unreasonable in failing to protect its inter-
est despite its ability to do so, due process does not require 
that the State save the party from its own lack of care. The 
balance required by Mullane clearly weighs in favor of find-
ing that the Indiana statutes satisfied the requirements of 
due process. Accordingly, I dissent. 
State cannot reasonably be expected to assume the risk of its citizens' busi-
ness ventures." Pet. for Cert. 27, n. 9. 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL, delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This appeal raises the question whether notice by publica-
tion and posting provides a mortgagee of real property with 
adequate notice of a proceeding to sell the mortgaged prop-
erty for nonpayment of taxes. 
I 
To secure an obligation to pay $14,000, Alfred Jean Moore 
executed a mortgage in favor of appellant Mennonite Board 
of Missions (MBM) on property in Elkhart, Indiana, that 
Moore had purchased from MBM. The mortgage was re-
corded in the Elkhart County Recorder's Office on March 1, 
1973. Under the terms of the agreement, Moore was re-
sponsible for paying all of the property taxes. Without 
MBM's knowledge, however, she failed to pay taxes on the 
property. 
Indiana law provides for the annual sale of real property on 
which payments of property taxes have been delinquent for 
fifteen months or longer. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-1 et seq. 
Prior to the sale, the county auditor must post notice in the 
county courthouse and publish notice once each week for 
three consecutive weeks. § 6-1.1-24-3. The owner of the 
property is entitled to notice by certified mail to his last 
known address. § 6-1.1-24-4. 1 Until 1980, however, Indi-
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ana law did not provide for notice by mail or personal service 
to mortgagees of property that was to be sold for nonpay-
ment of taxes. 2 
After the required notice is provided, the county treasurer 
holds a public auction at which the real property is sold to 
the highest bidder. § 6-1.1-24-5. The purchaser acquires a 
certificate of sale which constitutes a lien against the real 
property for the entire amount paid. §6-1.1-24-9. This 
lien is superior to all other liens against the property which 
existed at the time the certificate was issued. Ibid. 
The tax sale is followed by a two-year redemption period 
during which the "owner, occupant, lienholder, or other per-
son who has an interest in" the property may redeem the 
property. §6-1.1-25-1. To redeem the property an indi-
vidual must pay the county treasurer a sum sufficient to 
cover the purchase price of the property at the tax sale, the 
amount of taxes and special assessments paid by the pur-
chaser following the sale, plus an additional percentage speci-
fied in the statute. §§6-1.1-25-2, 6-1.1-25-3. The county 
in turn remits the payment to the purchaser of the property 
at the tax sale. 
If no one redeems the property during the statutory re-
demption period, the purchaser may apply to the county au-
ditor for a deed to the property. Before executing and deliv-
ering the deed, the county auditor must notify the former 
owner that he is still entitled to redeem the property. 
§6-1.1-25--6. No notice to the mortgagee is required. If 
Indiana law, the mortgagee is not considered an "owner" for purposes 
of§ 6-1.1-24--4. First Savings & Loan Assn. of Central Indiana v. Fur-
nish, 367 N. E. 2d 596, 600, n. 14 (Ind. App. 1977). 
2 Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24--4.2, added in 1980, provides for notice by certi-
fied mail to any mortgagee of real property which is subject to tax sale 
proceedings, if the mortgagee has annually requested such notice and has 
agreed to pay a fee, not to exceed $10, to cover the cost of sending notice. 
Because the events in question in this case occurred before the 1980 
amendment, the constitutionality of the amendment is not before us . 
0' 0 
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the property is not redeemed within thirty days, the county 
auditor may then execute and deliver a deed for the property 
to the purchaser, § 6--1.1-25-4, who thereby acquires "an es-
tate in fee simple absolute, free and clear of all liens and en-
cumbrances." § 6--1.1-25-4(d). 
After obtaining a deed, the purchaser may initiate an ac-
tion to quiet his title to the property. §6.1.1-25-14. The 
previous owner, lienholders, and others who claim to have an 
interest in the property may no longer redeem the property. 
They may defeat the title conveyed by the tax deed only by 
proving, inter alia, that the property had not been subject 
to, or assessed for, the taxes for which it was sold, that the 
taxes had been paid before the sale, or that the property was 
properly redeemed before the deed was executed. § 6.1.1-
25-16. 
In 1977 Elkhart County initiated proceedings to sell 
Moore's property for nonpayment of taxes. The County pro-
vided notice as required under the statute: it posted and 
published an announcement of the tax sale and mailed notice 
to Moore by certified mail. MBM was not informed of the 
pending tax sale either by the county auditor or by Moore. 
The property was sold for $1,167.75 to appellee Richard Ad-
ams on August 8, 1977. Neither Moore nor MBM appeared 
at the sale or took steps thereafter to redeem the property. 
Following the sale of her property, Moore continued to make 
payments each month to MBM, and as a result MBM did not 
realize that the property had been sold. On August 16, 
1979, MBM first learned of the tax sale. By then the re-
demption period had run and Moore still owed appellant 
$8,237.19. 
In November 1979, Adams filed a suit in state court seek-
ing to quiet title to the property. In opposition to Adams' 
motion for summary judgment, MBM contended that it had 
not received constitutionally adequate notice of the pending 
tax sale and of the opportunity to redeem the property fol-
lowing the tax sale. The trial court upheld the Indiana tax 
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sale statute against this constitutional challenge. The Indi-
ana Court of Appeals affirmed. 427 N. E. 2d 686 (1981). 
We noted probable jurisdiction,-- U. S. -- (1982), and 
we now reverse. 
II 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U. S. 306, 314 (1950), this Court recognized that prior to an 
action which will affect an interest in life, liberty, or property 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a State must provide "notice reasonably calcu-
lated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties 
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity 
to present their objections." Invoking this "elementary and 
fundamental requirement of due process," ibid, the Court 
held that published notice of an action to settle the accounts 
of a common trust fund was not sufficient to inform beneficia-
ries of the trust whose names and addresses were known. 
The Court explained that notice by publication was not rea-
sonably calculated to provide actual notice of the pending 
proceeding and was therefore inadequate to inform those who 
could be notified by more effective means such as personal 
service or mailed notice: 
"Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resi-
dent an advertisement in small type inserted in the back 
pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside 
the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds 
that the information will never reach him are large in-
deed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced 
when as here the notice required does not even name 
those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does 
not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. 
In weighing its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence 
with actual notice we are unable to regard this as more 
than a feint." I d., at 315.3 I 
3 The decision in Mullane rejected one of the premises underlying this / 
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In subsequent cases, this Court has adhered unwaiveringly 
to the principle announced in Mullane. In Walker v. City of 
Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112 (1956), for example, the Court 
held that notice of condemnation proceedings published in a 
Court's previous decisions concerning the requirements of notice in judicial 
proceedings: that due process rights may vary depending on whether ac-
tions are in rem or in persona. 339 U. S., at 312. See Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 206 (1977). Traditionally, when a state court 
based its jurisdiction upon its authority over the defendant's person, per-
sonal service was considered essential for the court to bind individuals who 
did not submit to its jurisdiction. See, e. g., Hamilton v. Brown, 161 
U. S. 256, 275 (1896); Arendt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 320 (1890); 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 726, 733-734 (1878) ("Due process of law 
would require appearance or personal service before the defendant could 
be personally bound by any judgment rendered."). In Hess v. Pawloski, 
274 U. S. 352 (1927), the Court recognized for the first time that service by 
registered mail, in place of personal service, may satisfy the requirements 
of due process. Constructive notice was never deemed sufficient to bind 
an individual in an action in personam. 
In contrast, in in rem or quasi in rem proceedings in which jurisdiction 
was based on the court's power over property within its territory, see gen-
erally Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 196-205, constructive notice to nonres-
idents was traditionally understood to satisfy the requirements of due 
process. In order to settle questions of title to property within its terri-
tory, a state court was generally required to proceed by an in rem action 
since the court could not otherwise bind nonresidents. At one time con-
structive service was considered the only means of notifying nonresidents 
since it was believed that "[p]rocess from the tribunals of one State cannot 
run into another State." Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, at 727. See Ballard v. 
Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 255 (1907). As a result, the nonresident acquired 
the duty "to take measures that in some way he shall be represented 
when his property is called into requisition." Id., at 262. If he 
"fail[ed] to get notice by the ordinary publications which have been usually 
required in such cases, it [was] his misfortune." Ibid. 
No corresponding duty was imposed on interested parties who resided 
within the State and whose identities were reasonably ascertainable. 
Even in actions in rem, such individuals were entitled to personal service. 
See, e. g., Arendt v. Griggs, supra, at 326-327. Where the identity of in-
terested residents could not be ascertained after a reasonably diligent in-
quiry, however, their interests in property could be affected by a proceed-
ing in rem as long as constructive notice was provided. See Hamilton v. 
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local newspaper was an inadequate means of informing a 
landowner whose name was known to the city and was on the 
official records. Similarly, in Schroeder v. City of New 
York, 371 U. S. 208 (1962), the Court concluded that publica-
tion in a newspaper and posted notices were inadequate to 
apprise a property owner of condemnation proceedings when 
his name and address were readily ascertainable from both 
deed records and tax rolls. Most recently, in Greene v. 
Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444 (1982), we held that posting a sum-
mons on the door of a tenant's apartment was an inadequate 
means of providing notice of forcible entry and detainer ac-
tions. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 
436 U. S. 1, 13-15 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 
U. S. 156, 174-175 (1974); Bank of Marin v. England, 385 
U. S. 99, 102 (1966); Covey v. Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 146-147 
(1956); City of New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 
344 u. s. 293, 296-297 (1953). 
This case is controlled by the analysis in Mullane. To 
begin with, a mortgagee possesses a substantial property in-
terest that is significantly affected by a tax sale. Under In-
diana law, a mortgagee acquires a lien on the owner's prop-
erty which may be conveyed together with the mortgagor's 
personal obligation to repay the debt secured by the mort-
gage. Ind. Code § 32--8-11-7. A mortgagee's security in-
Brown, supra, at 275; American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 61-62, 
65-66 (1911). 
Beginning with Mullane, this Court has recognized, contrary to the ear-
lier line of cases, "that an adverse judgment in rem directly affects the 
property owner by divesting him of his rights in the property before the 
court." Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 206. In rejecting the traditional 
justification for distinguishing between residents and nonresidents and be-
tween in rem and in personam actions, the Court has not left all interested 
claimants to the vagaries of indirect notice. Our cases have required the 
State to make efforts to provide actual notice to all interested parties com-
parable to the efforts that were previously required only with respect to 
identifiable residents. See infra, at 6. 
•. 
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terest generally has priority over subsequent claims or liens 
attaching to the property, and a purchase money mortgage 
takes precedence over virtually all other claims or liens in-
cluding those which antedate the execution of the mortgage. 
Ind. Code§ 32--8-11-4. The tax sale immediately and drasti-
cally diminishes the value of this security interest by grant-
ing the tax-sale purchaser a lien with priority over that of all 
other creditors. Ultimately, the tax sale may result in the 
complete nullification of the mortgagee's interest, since the 
purchaser acquires title free of all liens and other encum-
brances at the conclusion of the redemption period. 
Since a mortgagee clearly has a legally protected property 
interest, he is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to ap-
prise him of a pending tax sale. Cf. Wiswall v. Sampson, 55 
U. S. 52, 67 (1852). When the mortgagee is identified in a 
mortgage that is publicly recorded, constructive notice by 
publication must be supplemented by notice mailed to the 
mortgagor's last known available address, or by personal 
service. But unles~ mortgagee is not reasonably identifi-
able, constructive notice alone does not satisfy the mandate 
of Mullane. 4 
Neither notice by publication and posting, nor mailed no-
tice to the property owner, are means "such as one desirous 
of actually informing the [mortgagee] might reasonably adopt 
' In this case, the mortgage on file with the county recorder identified 
the mortgagee only as "MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS a corpora-
tion, of Wayne County, in the State of Ohio." We assume that the mort-
gagee's address could have been ascertained by reasonably diligent efforts. 
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 317 
(1950). Simply mailing a letter to "Mennonite Board of Missions, Wayne 
County, Ohio," quite likely would have provided actual notice, given "the 
well-known skill of postal officials and employees in making proper delivery 
of letters defectively addressed." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 
397-398 (1914). We do not suggest, however, that a governmental body is 
required to undertake extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and 
whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public record. 
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to accomplish it." Mullane, supra, at 315. Because they 
are designed primarily to attract prospective purchasers to 
the tax sale, publication and posting are unlikely to reach 
those who, although they have an interest in the property, do 
not make special efforts to keep abreast of such notices. 
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, supra, at 116; New York v. 
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra, at 296; Mullane, 
supra, at 315. Notice to the property owner, who is not in 
privity with his creditor and who has failed to take steps nec-
essary to preserve his own property interest, also cannot be 
expected to lead to actual notice to the mortgagee. Cf. N el-
son v. New York City, 352 U. S. 103, 107-109 (1956). The 
County's use of these less reliable forms of notice is not rea-
sonable where, as here, "an inexpensive and efficient mecha-
nism such as mail service is available." Greene v. Lindsey, 
supra, at 455. 
Personal service or mailed notice is required even though 
sophisticated creditors have means at their disposal to 
,Q.iscover whether property taxes have not been paid and 
1 whether tax sale proceedings are therefore likely to be initi-
ated. In the first place, a mortgage need not involve a com-
plex commercial transaction among knowledgeable parties, 
and it may well be the least sophisticated creditor whose se-
curity interest is threatened by a tax sale. More impor-
tantly, a party's ability to take steps to safeguard its inter-
ests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation. 
It is true that particularly extensive efforts to provide notice 
may often be required when the State is aware of a party's 
inexperience or incompetence. See, e. g., Memphis Light, 
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, supra, at 13-15; Covey v. 
Somers, supra. But it does not follow that the State may 
forego even the relatively modest administrative burden of 
providing notice by mail to parties who are particularly re-
sourceful.5 Cf. New York v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 
• Indeed, notice by mail to the mortgagee may ultimately relieve the 
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supra, at 297. Notice by mail or other means as certain to 
ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition 
to a proceeding which will adversely affect the interests of 
any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial 
practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertain-
able. Furthermore, a mortgagee's knowledge of delin-
quency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice 
that a tax sale is pending. The latter "was the information 
which the [County] was constitutionally obliged to give per-
sonally to the appellant-an obligation which the mailing of a 
single letter would have discharged." Schroeder v. City of 
New York, supra, at 214. 
We therefore conclude that the manner of notice provided 
to appellant did not meet the requirements of the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Indiana Court of Appeals is reversed and 
the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsis-
tent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
county of a more substantial administrative burden if the mortgagee ar-
ranges for payment of the delinquent taxes prior to the tax sale. 
6 This appeal also presents the question whether, before the county au-
ditor executes and delivers a deed to the tax-sale purchaser, the mortgagee 
is constitutionally entitled to notice of its right to redeem the property. 
Cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 229 (1946). Because we conclude that 
the failure to give adequate notice of the tax sale proceeding deprived ap-
pellant of due process of law, we need not reach this question. 
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